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Whether for Chilean NAFTA
(or NAFTA "Light") Accession:
The Necessity of Fast Track Authority
Pascual Covarrubias Meyer*
The full economic integration of the Americas is quickly becoming a reality. The pre-
vailing urgency is that the United States is possibly faced with losing its position as the
dominant driving force in the future of this hemisphere's trade policy. Simply put, the
United States is not actively directing the path trade agreements are taking now or in the
future. In addition, while Congress delays granting fast-track authority to the executive
branch, other opportunistic agreements, such as trade blocs like Mercosur and bilateral
trade agreements, are being drafted and ratified at breakneck speed. This comment first
examines Congress' lagging ratification of fast-track authority and the extent to which this
procrastination is hurting business opportunities for U.S. firms, as well as this country's
future role in setting the agenda and direction of the forthcoming Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). In addition, this comment examines how one of Mercosur's purposes,
along with other multilateral or unilateral trade agreements, is to effectuate and to develop
formidable bargaining power that will be adverse to the interests of the United States. This
comment next addresses the forces presently shaping a possible Chilean accession to the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and how Chile's associate membership
in Mercosur and its bilateral trade agreement with Canada both complicates and facilitates
accession.
Section II outlines recent fast-track developments in Congress and the effect this delay
has on both the U.S. economy and its export industry. Furthermore, this section reviews
the United States' role and influence in the future FTAA. Section III introduces Mercosur
and outlines its irreconcilable differences with the NAFTA's provisions and interests.
Section IV examines the recent Chilean accession to associate status in Mercosur and how
this trade alignment may have attenuated Chilean NAFTA accession. Section V discusses
the nature and effect of the recent Canada-Chile bilateral trade agreement, with an empha-
sis on provisions the two countries were able to successfully negotiate--concessions not
likely to be easily negotiated with the United States. Finally, Part VI draws conclusions on
the effects of NAFTA modeling in hemispheric trade agreements, which may be shadowed,
if not outrightly superseded, by Mercosur's blitz tactics. These tactics may eventually over-
shadow U.S. interests and promote Mercosur's singular interests as it leads the pack to the
eventual formation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Class of 1999; Staff Editor, Inteinational Law
Review Association of SMU.
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I. "The Future of the World Trading System will be Largely Determined
in Congress Over the Next Few Months."'
A. INTRODUCTION.
During the last decade, the United States transformed its economic involvement in
Latin America from economic and/or military aid to trade. 2 This shift was based on the
premise that trade is not only beneficial to all parties, but, more importantly, is sustain-
able over the long haul.3 Indeed, if the nations of this hemisphere continue this trend,
they will stimulate considerable economic growth that will raise the standard of living of
Latin Americans. 4 Therefore, this decade's introduction of the NAFTA effectively
demonstrated U.S. commitment to the concept that open markets constitute the best
means to increase prosperity for all nations of the Americas. 5
In addition, the recent increase in globalization of economies and the international-
ization of trade further requires all countries to entertain and to become part of trade
agreements. 6 These agreements lead to the formation of regional, as well as global, trad-
ing blocs.7 In response, the principal goal of hemispheric economic integration was
introduced at the Summit of the Americas in 1994, and was further promoted by an
agreement to negotiate for a Free Trade Area of the Americas by the year 2005.8
However, central to the present state of trade agreements is the issue of fast-track
1. Fred Bergstein, American Politics, Global Trade, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 1997, at 23.
2. Charles Dusseau, Fast- Track or Slow Pitch?, WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1997, at 96-98.
3. Id.
4. Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregogy W. Bowman, Economic Intergration in the Americas: "A Work in
Progress", 14 J. INTL. L. & Bus. 493,495 (1994).
5. Dusseau, supra note 2. Any consideration of this sort, however, must be secondary to U.S. inter-
ests because the United States cannot afford to turn its back on these opportunities. Prepared
Testimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairman and CEO of TRW, Inc: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade (1992). Clearly demonstrating the importance of trade,
U.S. exports for 1996 totaled $849 billion, of which $612 billion accounted for goods and the rest
for services. Id. Furthermore, total export and import trade accounted for over $1.8 trillion dol-
lars in business activity-a very significant 24% of the total U.S. economy. Id. To maintain and
increase this figure, foreign markets must be courted across the globe. Id.
6. Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in
International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. UJ. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 769, 770 (1997). The recent con-
comitant tumbling of both the U.S. and the Asian stock markets indicates how much world
economies are presently intertwined. Rep. Philip Crane, Fast-track Keeping America on the right
path, THE HILL, Nov. 5, 1997, at 22.
7. Hicks, supra note 6, at 770.
8. Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements and the Establishment of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas, LAw & PoucY INT'L Bus., June 22,1996, at 945.
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authority.9 Nevertheless, although free hemispheric trade is undeniably good for the
United States, both Democrats and Republicans are "so paralyzed by their minority
wings that [free trade] might elude us.' 10
Several reasons account for the lack of support for fast-track authority. First,
Congress is not pressured to move ahead with fast-track because the American public does
not recognize the importance of trade to the future economy.II Second, politicians are not
forthright in their support for fast-track because no matter what side they support, "[they]
are going to get bashed.' 12 Clearly, "these politicians aren't stupid-you might as well wait
as long as you can before getting bashed." 13 For example, some members of the GOP
avoid free trade due to Pat Buchanan and his followers. 14 The Democrats, for their part,
avoid the issue of free trade because they previously alienated facets of their urban support
by endorsing welfare reform. 15 Moreover, some Democrats will not commit to support
fast-track authority unless the executive promises a firm commitment to adequate envi-
ronmental and labor protection. 16 Concomitantly, the U.S. AFL-CIO extensively lobbied
the Democratic party to insist on labor provisions in future trade agreements, with the
intent of protecting U.S. jobs. 17 In addition, the U.S. AFL-CIO funded and cooperated
with its Chilean counterpart, the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, for a general anti-fast-
track demonstration that occurred in November 1997 in Santiago, Chile. 18 These factors
make it dear that legislators from both parties seem reluctant to open commercial mar-
kets, deeming such action as threatening to national sovereignty by benefiting only large
corporations while jobs are transferred to lower-priced labor markets. 19
Other reasons why a concerted effort in passing fast-track failed to materialize involve
a trend of "Congressional independence, fractiousness, and indifference on foreign policy
9. Fast-track authority expedites congressional approval of Executive branch negotiated trade
agreements, with Congress retaining the right of final approval and to implement whatever legis-
lation is necessary to accommodate the agreement. Economic Research Service, Agricultural out-
look- Part II of III, M2 PRisswiaR, Oct. 24, 1997. This authority is generally intended to expedite
international agreements, thereby reassuring foreign governments that negotiations will be rati-
fied or not. Id. Further, it also dispenses with the inevitable squabbling in Congress that, in the
normal legislative process, would necessarily alter agreements. Id.
10. Barbara Bowie-Whitman, U.S. Hurt by foot dragging, J. OF COM., Oct. 24, 1997, at 7A.
11. Id.
12. Elizabeth Bryant, State, Lawmakers Split Over Fast Track, STATES NEws SERV., Oct. 17,1997.
13. Id.
14. Bowie-Whitman, supra note 10, at A7.
15. Id.
16. Abid Aslam, Trade-U.S.: Clinton on Fast Track to Nowhere?, INTER. PRESS. SERV., July 25, 1997.
17. Chile Stays Cool About "Fast-Track" to NAFTA, LATIN AM. REG'L REPORTS: SOUTHERN CONE, Oct. 7,
1997, at 1.
18. Id.
19. Trade-Finance: U.S. Delays Release of NAFTA Review, INTER. PRESS. SERV., July 4,1997.
140 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas
matters" that followed the end of the Cold War.20 Moreover, 40 percent of the Senate and
a majority of the House were elected since the fall of the Berlin Wall-a telltale sign that
"this is a generation of lawmakers that has not had world affairs on the radar screen: 21
Accordingly, the Clinton administration postponed the November fast-track vote in the
House of Representatives due to justifiable concerns that the bill was likely to be defeat-
ed.22 In this decision, the President received scant support from his own party, even
though he ironically had solid support from the Republicans. 23 Nevertheless, this
November victory for fast-track opponents, lead by Congressman Richard Gephart, out-
lines the nascent forces of "isolationism and protectionism. 24 Moreover, this defeat comes
at a time when the United States is looked to for global leadership, and sadly "invites com-
parisons to the 1930's." 25
Therefore, as far as international trade is concerned, "what one has, at best, is an
unstable America, an inward-looking America.' 26 Moreover, the postponement of a fast-
track vote until next year further complicates its passing, due to scheduled House elec-
tions-a fact that creates even more pressure from the representative's districts to place
local interests ahead of national ones.27
The question then becomes: how did the president fail to secure the requisite votes
from his own party? A partial answer is complacency in assuming the votes would come
around as they had in 1993 when the NAFTA was ratified.28 Thus, it is clear the President
does not have a single "buddy" in Congress. 29 Some commentators equate this to a per-
sonality fault of the President, since he does not seem to create these types of
relationships. 30 Further complicating the rift between the President and his own party has
been the departure of key personnel crucial in relaxing tensions with the Democrats--
people like Harold M. Ickes, George Stephanopoulos, and Leon E. Panetta.31 Thanks to
their departure, no one remained in the White House who could relate to both organized
20. James Kitfield, Opponents Gave Short Shrift to Foreign Policy, THE NAT'L J., Nov. 1, 1997, at 2193.
21. Id.
22. If He Walks Like a Lame Duck..., ECONOMIST, U.S. ed., Nov. 15, 1997, at 25.
23. Id. In this last round, the President had mustered 160 of the 228 Republican votes, but only 45 of
the 205 Democratic votes. Id. Unfortunately for the President, approximately 25 crucial conserva-
tive Republican votes were to be had only in exchange for Clinton imposing sanctions on anti-
abortion restrictions in American foreign aid-something he refused to do. Id.
24. Alan Toulin, Is the Lid Falling on Free Trade?: Clinton's Inability to Get Fast Track Authority in
Trade Talks Could Signal the End of an Era, FIN. POST, Nov. 13, 1997, at 14.
25. James K, Glassman, House Retreats to its Anti-Trade Cave; "Fast Track" Loss Takes U.S.Back to
Dark Days of 1929, ARiz. REPuBuc, Nov. 13, 1997, at B9.
26. Toulin, supra note 24.
27. If He Walks Like a Lame Duck..., supra note 22, at 25.
28. Id.
29. John M. Broder & Lizette Alvarez, Democrats Sound Like a Couple in Need of Therapy, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15,1997, at All.
30. Id.
31. Id. Specifically, Mr. Ickes had longtime ties to organized labor and Mr. Stephanopoulos had close
ties to Richard Gephart. Id
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labor and the liberal wing of the House Democrats. 32 Nevertheless, the President will not
only strive to resubmit fast-track legislation in early 1998, but is also convinced he will
have a "working majority" in the House of Representatives as long as he presents a "good
proposal."33
Regardless of Congress' domestic stalemate, the international trade agreement fever
rushes ahead with or without the United States. Indeed, "some nations, especially our
competitors in Europe and Asia, hope the U.S. never shows up at all:' 34 For example, the
European Community (EU) scheduled a trade summit with Mercosur, set for 1999.35 In
addition, the EU launched trade talks anticipated to condude in bilateral trade agreements
not only with Chile, but also with Mexico. 36 Indeed, the sentiment expressed by French
President Chirac during a visit to Latin America, was that Latin America should look to
Europe for leadership, not toward the United States.37 This sentiment is further made
clear since (aside from Brazil's protectionist tendencies) Mercosur is dearly acting as a
bloc, as opposed to the NAFTA, which is a loose federation. 38
Aside from the encroachment of the world, there is another crucial reason why fast-
track should be ratified. If the United States arrives at the Presidential Summit in Chile in
March 1998 without fast-track authority, the United States hemispheric trading partners
will likely believe that once again the U.S. is withdrawing from the creation of the FrAA.
Since the FTAA was initially a U.S. initiative, the possibility that the United States would
withdraw amounts to "a devastating loss of credibility" 39 Worse than that, however, is that
32. Id.
33. Clinton Tries to Reassure Latin America on Fast Track Bill, NAT'L J. CONGRESS DAILY, Nov. 14,1997.
34. Dusseau, supra note 2, at 96-98. It is ironic that Latin American market potential and power is
often overlooked. Edward Schumacher, Clinton Fumbles an American Alliance, WALL ST. J., May 7,
1997, at A18. Specifically, Latin America receives 18% of U.S. exports, making it the U.S.'s fastest
growing export market. Furthermore, note that Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina's economies
respectively and approximately correspond to China, South Korea, and Taiwan. Accordingly, the
European Union is proposing a trade agreement with Mercosur, and Japan and China have dis-
patched trade delegations to court the Mercosur economies. Economic Research Service:
Agricultural outlook-Part II of III, supra note 9.
35. Kitfield, supra note 20, at 2193.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The Clash Between the Mercosur and NAFTA, LATIN AM. REG. REP.: MEX. AND NAFrA REPORT, Oct
10, 1996, at 1.
39. Jim Lobe, US.-Americas: Washington's Uncertain Trumpet on Trade, INTER. PRESS. SERV., May 13,
1997. The United States will, of course, have some influence even if it "sits out" the next few
years, but Congress must take note that the key stipulations on the scope and nature of the FTAA
will be made before the end of the century. David A. Gantz, The United States and the Expansion
of Western Hemisphere Free Trade: Participant or Observer?, 14 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 381, 407
(1997). A note on the trade surplus: a plausible theory explains the trade surplus as fueled by
foreign states' need for hard U.S. currency, which therefore makes them more willing to sell prod-
ucts at a lower price. Sen. Chuck Grassley, Worried about the Trade Deficit? Don't be-the Link to
U.S. Job Loss, Lower Wages and Unemployment Isn't There, ROLL CALL, Oct. 20, 1997. Further, U.S.
negotiators lacking authority cannot protect or further U.S. interests, especially if a homogeneous
and undivided Latin American Mercosur is what those negotiators can expect on the other side
of the table. Gantz, supra note 39, at 406. Notably, President Clinton delayed his October 1997
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the United States will be remiss in not properly preparing for the economy of the twenty-
first century.4
0
B. WHAT Is THE ECONOMIC REALITY THAT HASTENS THE APPROVAL OF FAST-TRACK
AuTHORITY?
Regardless of fast-track authority, the economic and financial integration of the
Western Hemisphere will proceed at its current "break neck speed."41 President Clinton
recently talked about the importance of fast-track by stating: "The economy down here
[South America) is on a fast track. I can see it all around me. They are not waiting for us
to do this [fast-track authority]7 42 Further pressing for an immediate approval of fast-
track is the fact that there are presently more than thirty bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments in this hemisphere.43 Of these agreements, the NAFTA is the only one to which the
United States belongs. 44 Indeed, no misconception should exist as to how serious the
Mercosur economies are willing to promote their well being. As an example of this
resolve, Mercosur recently began a dialogue on the designation of a singular currency,
much like that proposed for the European Union.45 This leads to the natural condusion
visit to Latin America, hoping for fast-track approval. Mark Suzman, Clinton Set on Fast-Track
for Trade Deals, Latin American Trip Reinforces President's Determination to Pursue Issue in
Congress, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at 5. During this trip the President "sought to distract atten-
tion from the lack of progress on fast-track in Washington by praising the region's progress in
spreading democracy, and emphasizing new business and trade opportunities that could be pur-
sued before new trade agreements were reached." Id.
40. Rep. Jim Kolbe, NAFTA and the expansion offree trade: Current issues and future prospects 'A view
from capitol hill.," 14 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAw 291,294 (1997).
41. Prepared Testimony of Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, President, Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd.,
Before the House Comm. on International Relations, Subcomm. on International Economic Policy
and Trade. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free
Trade Area of the Americas?, FED. NEws SERV., June 11, 1997. Furthermore, Mercosur's free
trade zone agreement with the Andean Community may be signed by the end of 1997-a trade
bloc which will effectively account for 70 percent of South America's economy. Mercosur,
Andean Community Reportedly to Form Free Trade Zone, BBC, SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Sept. 2, 1997.
42. Remarks by the President in Television Town Hall, M2 PRESSWIRE, (M2 Communications Ltd.),
Oct. 27, 1997. Furthermore, aside from Canada's bilateral trade agreement with Chile, Mexico is
currently negotiating a partial preference agreement with Mercosur. Blanco Hails Free Trade in
Americas, THE NEws, Oct. 20, 1997.
43. Economic Research Service: Agricultural Outlook-Part II of lL, supra note 9.
44. Id
45. Argentine President Addresses Brazilian Senate on importance of Mercosur, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 13, 1997.
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that the Mercosur economies will further "reconcile exchange and fiscal policies, and long-
term interest rates, and attain a debt-GDP balance: 46 All of which is good for Mercosur,
but may not be in the best interest of the United States.
In addition, the free trade that could be taking place now, provided the Executive
branch had negotiating power, is crucial because free and fair trade benefits the "most effi-
cient" economy.47 Thus, it is the United States that would reap the benefits of free trade.48
This is due to the United States having the most advanced technology, as well as the high-
est skilled and educated workforce in the hemisphere.49  Furthermore, U.S. competitive-
ness and efficiency make it the strongest economy in the world due to last decade's exten-
sive industrial restructuring, corporate downsizing, and "budgetary belt-tightening: 5°
With the preceding in mind, the issue of fast-track can best be understood by con-
sidering two important developments. The first development is in the context of the
present race to secure hemispheric, multilateral, or unilateral preferential trade agree-
ments that will eventually culminate in the forthcoming Free Trade Area of the
Americas. Second, fast-track can be understood in terms of the possible Chilean acces-
sion to the NAFTA.
First, we see fast-track in the context of hemispheric integration in which the lack of
executive authority is "negatively affecting the ability of the United States to shape the
agenda for a Free Trade Area of the Americas."5 1 Indeed, other nations of this hemisphere
formed common markets to emulate the success of "our internal market"-the strength of
which diminishes as the Latin trade blocs grow and as preferential trade agreements are
ratified.52 Thus, the U.S's economic role in this hemisphere "is being defined by every
other nation with any economic sense, except our own.' 53
The basic consideration surrounding fast-track involves the simple fact that foreign
governments are reluctant to expend any effort to negotiate trade agreements that are sub-
ject to amendment by Congress. 54 However, fast-track is not something new. Fast track
has been used since 1974 to negotiate every international trade agreement 55 Thus, for
more than two decades Congress has delegated this authority to the executive branch.
However, it is not accurate to interpret this power as anything other than a shared duty of
46. Id.
47. Grassley, supra note 39.
48. Id.
49. 1d.
50. Rep. Jim Kolbe, Debunking Fast-Track Fear-Mongers: They are the 1990's Xenophobic Version of
the "Know-Nothing Party," ROLL CALL, Oct. 20, 1997.
51. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond- Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41.
52. Bowie-Whitman, supra note 10.
53. Dusseau, supra note 2.
54. Clinton Delays Fast-Track Trade Plan: Renewal of President's Authority Seen Crucial for U.S. Trade
Position, CHEM. MARKEr REP., Sept. 15, 1997, at 3.
55. Prepared Testimony of Jerry Haar, Senior Research Associate and Director, Inter-American Business
and Labor Program, North-South Center at the University of Miami before the House International
Relations Comm., FED. NEws SERV., Sept. 17, 1997.
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both bodies and not, as some would suggest a naked grab for power by the'Executive
branch in disregard to Congress. 56 But, a victory for those opposing fast-track could result
in serious economic consequences.57 However, an important key to passing this executive
authority may lie in distancing negotiating authority from its association with the
NAFTA.5 8 Thus, for example, when critics argue that jobs go south with trade agreements
like the NAFTA or with possible fast-track authority, they should concomitantly take into
account the jobs that are going south because fast-track has not passed.59
There are numerous examples of how business opportunities are being lost because
fast-track has not been approved. First in line is Catepillar, Inc.60 Catepillar is establish-
ing a factory in Brazil to produce heavy machinery and equipment for export to Chile.61
The reason is that products manufactured in Brazil receive preferential treatment by the
Mercosur signatories, and thus are phased out from an 11 percent Chilean tariff-an
advantage that will not apply to U.S. companies based outside the Mercosur trade bloc. 62
Similarly, Stupp Corporation, a Louisiana based company, lost a $100 million contract to
an Argentine company to export pipe destined for an Argentine-Chilean pipeline because
of a 27 percent Mercosur imposed tariff.63 In addition, several multinational companies
like IBM, Southwestern Bell, and McDonald's are planning to source equipment from
Canada or Mexico (instead of the United States) because these two countries, which coin-
cidentally comprise two-thirds of the NAFTA pack, already have preferential trade agree-
56. Id.
57. Bergstein, supra note 1. Asian and Latin American markets, heavily dependent on the American
market, might further defensive actions. Ia In addition, both China and Russia may lose interest
in further liberalization -- a move that would effectively stall a long history of globalization. Id.
58. Id. The strongest anti-NAFTA protectionist factions include the textile, apparel, and agricultural
industries. Id. Furthermore, anti-dumping and process protectionism are fiercely defended by
lobbyists. Id.
59. Schumacher, supra note 34. The CEO of Quaker Fabric Corporation in Fall River, Massachusetts,
faced the reality that access to the Chilean market costs his company 11% more than his
Canadian or Mexican counterparts. Amy Borrus, Business is in a Hurry for Fast-Track, Bus. WEEK,
Sept. 15, 1997. Consequently, if Quaker Fabric Corporation could have access to the rest of Latin
America, "as we do in Mexico, we could increase sales 15%, adding close to 300 people," at the
U.S. plant. Id
60. Schumacher, supra note 34.
61. Id.
62. Id. Other companies likely to follow Catepillar's lead include Eastman Kodak and General
Electric. Id.
63. Paul Blustein, Making a case for South America; White House Prepares Arguments on Trade in
Advance of Clinton, WASH. PosT, Oct. 12,1997, at A32.
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ments with Chile.64 A further example is Sherwin Williams' purchase of the Chilean com-
pany, Pinturas Andinas S.A., a move designed solely to "strengthen [its] position in the
Mercosur market. 65 In simple words, companies like these and others, such as Coca Cola,
General Electric, and Eastman Kodak, are all presented with an option--export jobs or
lose entire markets. 66
Another rallying cry from opponents of fast-track is that a bigger trade deficit, along
with an associated loss of jobs and lower wages for Americans, is what we can expect from
further trade liberalization. 67 However, U.S. history and comparative studies show a lack
of correlation between these variables.68 It is time opponents to fast-track stop using iso-
lated incidents of contaminated strawberries grown in Mexico, but processed in the United
States, to give a bad reputation to all foreign products.69
In this light, one can begin to see what the United States is up against with Brazil and
Argentina. In the last seven years, Brazil's economy streamlined from an astonishing 1,600
percent inflation to a respectable 5 percent. 70 Furthermore, Brazil's imports from the
United States almost doubled in the last five years to almost $11.6 billion.7 1 Similarly,
Argentina also doubled its imports from the United States to about $4.1 billion.72
The second context under which fast-track can be explored is in terms of Chilean
accession to the NAFTA. Chilean accession is discussed below; however, as an introduc-
64. Schumacher, supra note 34. Furthermore, the NAFTA really has not done too bad; the Council
of the Americas recently released a study that revealed that of 21 U.S. states, nine have experi-
enced a 40% increase in exports to Canada and Mexico since the NAFTA was enacted, while
another seven have seen a 30% increase. Id. In California alone, the California World Trade
Commission estimates that exports to Mexico sustain more than 125,000 jobs, of which 25,000
resulted in 1995 alone. Id. On the other hand, the first couple of years of the NAFTKs inancy
were rough due to the peso crisis in Mexico and the subsequent recession the peso crisis caused.
However, in comparison to a similar situation in the early eighties, Mexico bounced back "much
more quickly than they did when.. .there was no NAFTA" Remarks by the President in Television
Town Hall, supra note 42.
65. Regional Update: Chile-Sherwin-Williams Paints the Town, LuxER NEws INC., July 1, 1997.
66. Paul Magnusson, Commentary: Why Washington Mustn't Stop Now., Bus. WEEK, April 21, 1997.
For example, IBM of Chile imports $35 million yearly in tariff free PCs from Mexico, which it
would build domestically if it weren't for the 11% tariff. Id.
67. Grassley, supra note 39.
68. Id. For example, in 1975 unemployment was 8.5%. However, this was the last year the United
States held a trade surplus. 1996 saw a trade deficit of $114 billion, yet an unemployment rate of
just 5%. Id. Similarly, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden all have had trade surpluses for the
last 15 years, yet their unemployment rates have repeatedly totaled between 7 and 9%. Id.
69. Kolbe, supra note 50.
70. William Douglas, Clinton's Southern Strategy/Lacking Pact, He Brings Gifts to S. America,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 12, 1997, at A07.
71. Id.
72. Id. For both countries, exports to the United States have been pale in comparison to imports. Id.
Brazil and Argentina respectively exported $8.1 and $1.9 billion to the United States. Id.
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tion, Chile is a great choice for NAFTA expansion for many reasons. 73 First, Chile has
become a strong economy with an average annual increase in gross national product of 6
percent for the last decade. 74 Furthermore, Chile has a good record on labor and environ-
mental issues. 75 Moreover, Chilean accession can only benefit the United States because it
is Chile that has to eliminate tariffs on competitive U.S. exports, including fertilizer, auto-
mobiles, agriculture, telecommunications, and chemicals. 76
C. WILL THE FTAA BE MORE LKE THE NAFrA OR MERCOSUR.
As stated above, the United States is committed to free trade in the Americas by the year
2005. The path this trade area will take is not as dear as the date on which it will take form.
It is clear that in the formation of this bloc the U.S. may lose an opportunity to lead the agen-
da for trade integration not only in this hemisphere, but around the world--something that
is "dearly not in U.S. interest."77 Thus, the United States' role as leader in trade relations with
the sole region of the world in which it sustains a trade surplus is in jeopardy.78 This occurs
while singular countries jockey to further their own economic objectives. 79 Regardless, suc-
cessful creation and implementation of any hemispheric integration plan or agreement
requires a substantial amount of time, effort, and political will. 80 In addition, the formation
of the FTAA requires participation by the United States, since it comprises the largest export
and import market for most of Latin America.8 1 Furthermore, while fast-track is not neces-
sary to begin negotiations, it is crucial to the conclusion of any agreement.82 In summary, if
a FTAA is to ever solidify, U.S. involvement is required,83 as "there's no way to accomplish
this without the leadership of the biggest market in the world.' 84
To buy time, the United States calculated several measures. For example, a part of the
strategy may lie in "atomizing" Mercosur with respect to FTAA negotiations.8 5 Chile's
Foreign Minister, Jose Miguel Insuza, described this practice as "a policy from the 1950's,
when they though they could give us each a candy and keep us divided, things are different
73. Prepared Testimony of Jerry Haar, Senior Research Associate and Director, Inter-American Business
and Labor Program, North-South Center at the University of Miami, before the House International




77. White House Briefing National Press Club Morning Newsmaker with Thomas McLart, White
House Special Envoy for the Americas; Re: the President's Upcoming Trip to South America, FED.
NEws SERv., Oct. 10, 1997.
78. Dusseau, supra note 2.
79. Id.
80. Abbott & Bowman, supra note 4, at 512.
81. Kevin G. Hall, Fast-Track Trouble Puts Hemisphere in Turmoil J. oF CoMm., Nov. 12,1997, at 5A.
82. Kitfield, supra note 20.
83. Id
84. Id.
85. Marcela Valente, Trade-Mercosur: Bloc Resists "Dissolving" into FTAA, INTErPREss SERv., Oct. 13,
1997.
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now.' 86 Atomizing Mercosur may indeed be designed to create internal competition and
tension.8 7 An example of internal strife, which has been also described as "meddling polit-
ically," includes offering F- 16 fighters to Chile.88 This offer effectively lifts a twenty year-
old U.S. embargo on such arms.8 9
While the United States offers something to Chile, it also offers something to
Argentina. What the United States offered Argentina was status as non-NATO ally-an
offer Chile has not taken lightly.90 This alliance, which gives Argentina access to surplus
U.S. arms is also interpreted as hostile by Brazil.9 1 The United States, however, is billing
Argentina's non-NATO ally status as recognition for Argentina's "role and participation in
international peacekeeping." 92 In addition, a final atomizing tactic involves Brazil's desire
for a seat on the United Nation's Security Council, something Argentina, among others,
will not approve. 93
In contrast, Latin American countries have their own dynamic ideas in the construc-
tion of hemispheric trade. For example, inflated sentiment in some countries such as
Chile furthers the belief that the only way to confront the United States in free trade agree-
ment negotiations is "through a large [tradelbloc' 94 Thus, for example, Chile could sig-
nificantly increase its negotiating power against the United States as a part of a Mercosur
led FTAA. 95 In addition, Brazil, as the leading power of Mercosur, proposed gradual nego-
tiations for a FTAA with no deadlines. 96 The United States, on the other hand, is pressing
for tariff reduction negotiations as soon as 1998.97 In short, Latin American sentiment
toward the United States can easily be interpreted as cold in that "the U.S. is trying to herd
us into this thing [FTAA] like the buffaloes in the [wild west], and just like those buffaloes,
if we allow it, we will be heading for extinction.'98
86. Slow Track to Fast-Track; Clinton Administration's Push for Fast-Track Authorization of Trade
Deals, ECONOMIST, Sep. 13, 1997, at 33.
87. Valente, supra note 85.
88. William Pfaff, Don't Forget That Globalization Creates Losers, Too, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 13,
1997, at 8.
89. Id.
90. Valente, supra note 85. This is a move that Chileans fear will upset the regional balance of power.
Suzman, supra note 39.
91. Pfaff, supra note 88.
92. Special While House Briefing with Sandy Berger, National Secutiry Adviser to the President and
Mack McLarty, the President's Special envoy for the Hemisphere FED. NEws SERv., Oct. 7, 1997.
93. Valente, supra note 85.
94. U.S. Policy Takes a Drubbing Chile & Argentina Provide Counter to NAFTA Report, LATIN AM.
WKLY REP., July 15, 1997, at 330.
95. Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Potential Conflict Areas in Any Future Negotiations Between Mercasur
and the NAFTA to Create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 14 ARi.. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305, 306
(1997).
96. Valente, supra note 85.
97. I& Indeed, the U.S strategy has been stated to include forging the "greatest possible space for
placing its products in the rest of the countries in the continent," while at the same time seeking
"to curb the proliferation of successful blocs like MERCOSUR." Id.
98. Anthony Faiola, Brazilians Wary of U.S. trade Pact, Businesses Fear Dropped Barriers Could
Damage Recovering Economy, WASH. PoST, Oct. 16,1997, at A24.
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To complicate matters, although the prevailing idea about the FTAA is that it must
necessarily amalgamate the NAFTA and Mercosur, it is probable that both blocs will have
to contend with a strong third player, the Andean Pact 99 Furthermore, even if no fast-
track opposition existed in the United States, Mercosur and particularly Brazil already
form a formidable economic unit with notable negotiating power.100 This power derives
from the extent of integration within Mercosur and its relative size in relation to Latin
America. 10 1 Nonetheless, Mercosur will likely use the November postponement of fast-
track to step up its negotiations with the Andean Pact and the Central American Common
Market, to effectively increase their negotiating power. 102 Furthermore, just as the AFL-
CIO wants binding resolutions on labor, thereby opposing fast-track, the lack of fast-track
will open the door for the agenda proposed by Mercosur-an agenda that is far less favor-
able to workers' rights.' 03
Finally, Mercosur's push to expand into the rest of Latin America with a series of
Mercosur-Chile type agreements will further strengthen Mercosur's go slow approach. 1° 4
This approach seems forced on Brazil, for example, because local companies are not mod-
ern enough for global competitiveness.105 Furthermore, heavy taxation by the Brazilian
government also lessened the possibility of Brazilian domestic business competing against
the United States.106 Nonetheless, the U.S. would like to accelerate the go-slow approach
and would ideally like the FTAA to start by the year 2000.107 This comes at a time when
the United States enjoys economic strength not affected by the business cycle.' 08 The
attenuation of the business cycle must be comprehended in terms of international trade,
since it constitutes expanded production and efficiency as a mechanism to keep a check on
inflation. 109 Accordingly, Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve Chairman, stated that
"import provid[es] a safety valve in a U.S. economy marked by a high degree of resource
utilization.' 110 Thus, the expansion of international markets is the reason the internation-
99. Gantz, supra note 39, at 405. Recently, the Andean Pact (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
and Bolivia) designated a secretary general and also amended the agreement to include the for-
mation of both a parliament and a court of justice in the next five years. Id. Nonetheless,
Mercosur and the Andean Pact expect to have a negotiated agreement by the end of 1997.
Andean, LATIN AM. REG'L REP.: MEx. & NAFTA REP., Oct. 21,1997, at 4.
100. Bernal, supra note 8.
101. Id. For example, Mercosur represents 50% of Latin America's GDP, 40% of its population, and a
third of its foreign trade. Id.
102. Hall, supra note 81.
103. Adrienne Fox, Are Free-Trade Deals on Hold?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 14, 1997, at Al.
104. Gantz, supra note 39. The "go slow" approach will allow Mercosur (a.ka., Brazil's interests) to
form closer ties with the rest of Latin America. Id. Furthermore, Brazil has demonstrated a desire
to drag its feet in market access negotiations unless the United States is willing to improve its
market access for Brazilian products (orange juice, textiles, footwear, tobacco, sugar, and steel).
Id.
105. Faiola, supra note 98.
106. Id.
107. The Clash Between the Mercosur and NAFTA, supra note 38.
108. Dusseau, supra note 2.
109. Id.
110. Bowie-Whitman, supra note 10.
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al business sector is a key component in the current bullish U.S economy.111
Furthermore, U.S. exports continue to rise and exports are a major driving force in
the creation of jobs and economic growth in the United States.11 2 On the other hand, the
criticism that only large companies benefit from trade is not true. 113 Indeed, small and
medium sized companies play a significant role in exports both in their own right and also
provide products and services to large exporting companies. 114 Ninety-five percent of
U.S. exporters are small and medium sized companies, of which three-fourths employ less
than fifty people, experience fewer closings, and grow jobs at a faster rate.115 With this in
mind, it is important to note that United States can only benefit by equalizing tariff rates
with Latin American countries. 116 Since U.S. tariffs presently average around 3 percent,
while Latin American tariffs average around 12 percent, any treatment of trade with Latin
America must initially benefit the United States." 7
The importance of trade is also explained in terms of the success of the NAFTA." 8
This is because in 1996 the NAFTA increased real exports to Mexico by $12 billion, with a
concomitant real increase in imports of $5 billion-figures due to a five fold reduction of
Mexican tariffs as compared to the United States whose tariff's were much lower to begin
with. 119 Furthermore, imports contribute to price stability and exports contribute to
growth. 120 In addition, with growth rates approximating 5 percent, Latin American coun-
tries like Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and even Mexico can and will want to buy U.S.
exports. 12 1 This fact, of course, has not escaped the attention of our neighbors in Asia.
Indeed, the International Monetary Fund states that trade between Asia and Latin
American has grown for the last three years at a rate of 27-40 percent. 122 Thus, Latin
111. Dusseau, supra note 2.
112. Prepared Testimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairman and CEO of TRW, Inc., Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade, supra note 5. Specifically, US. total economic growth as
a whole has been outpaced by growth in the export industry. Id. Furthermore, 1996 growth in
U.S. GDP was a mere 2.4% compared to real terms exports of goods and services of 6.5%. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Export figures from 1992 reveal that small and medium sized companies with fewer than
500 employees accounted for $109 billion in goods exports, which in turn accounts for 29%
of total U.S. exports of goods. Id. Furthermore, export related jobs accounted for one-eighth
of net jobs created in 1992-1996, and presently account for 10% of civilian positions and
20% of manufacturing jobs. Id. (Exports currently support a total of 11 million jobs in the
U.S.) Grassley, supra note 39. In addition, not only do export-related jobs pay 13% more
than the average U.S. wage, but jobs supported by exports pay 20% more than the average
U.S. wage. Id. The above does not even take into account the benefits to service providers like
banks and insurance companies. Id.
115. William M. Daley, Trade Is a Pocketbook Issue, J. oF Comm., Nov. 5, 1997, at 6A.
116. Magnusson, supra note 66.
117. Id.
118. Abid Aslam, Trade: Clinton Declares NAFTA a Winner, INTERPRFs. SERv., July 11, 1997.
119. Id.
120. Bowie-Whitman, supra note 10.
121. Id.
122. Stephanie Noecker, Survey says... "Si': Bus. MEX., Nov. 1, 1997.
150 NAFTA. Law and Business Review of the Americas
American is a hot area of trade for Asia" 123 The United States should not ignore this fact.
As it relates to Latin America, a Mercosur led Latin American trade bloc may actually
facilitate the ultimate goal of a Free Trade Area of the Americas. 124 Mercosur serves to
resolve "problems that inevitably result from attempts to integrate economies that are vast-
ly different in size and development on a much more manageable, sub-regional level where
the disparities tend to be less stark." 125 Another advantage of a strong Mercosur is its
function as an effective negotiating counterweight that may force the United States to
eliminate anti-dumping measures and other deleterious protectionist policies.126
Nevertheless, a failure by the U.S. Congress to pass fast-track authority may mean
weak bargaining power in formation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. 127 While
opponents of the NAFTA equate fast-track only in the context of the NAFTA, fast-track is
not NAFTA!"128 The agreements that may evolve from fast-track will encompass Latin
123. Id.
124. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41.
125. Id As noted in the manner by which pressure was exerted on Paraguay by Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay to attenuate the threat of a coup d'etat FTAA to be associated historically with Clinton,
GAZETA MERCANTL ONLINE, Oct. 24,1997.
126. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41.
127. Id. On the other hand, in the United States, $480 million are lost every year that Chilean NAFTA
accession is delayed because of the existence of an 11% tariff on all goods originating in the U.S.
Regional Update, Chile--AMCHAM: NAFTA Exclusion Hurts U.S. Business, SourH Am. REPORT,
June 1, 1997.
128. Prepared Testimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairman and CEO of TRW, Inc., Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade, supra note 5. NAFTA opponents often cite illegal immi-
gration, border environmental disasters and maquilladoras, as undesirable consequences of the
NAFTA. Id. Although the criticisms are not baseless, these problems are specific to Mexico and
are not relevant to trade relations with other countries. Id. Indeed, the critics are strongly backed
by the global competitors that are furiously working to establish trade relations without inviting
the United States. Id. It is crucial to note that, notwithstanding the obvious importance of envi-
ronmental problems, a trade agreements' purpose is to align trade practices and not to "provide a
disincentive to pollute" Economic Research Service: Agricultural Outlook-Part II of II, supra note
9. Although more difficult, a preferable method to achieve the same environmental end is by
independent environmental agreements. Id For example, Argentina's President Menem recently
stated, "a global problem such as climate change requires a global answer from all countries."
Suzman, supra note 39. Furthermore, in defense of the NAFTA, a July 1997 report stated the fol-
lowing successes of NAFTA:
1) A 36% export growth to Mexico from 1993-96 (boost of real exports increase by
$12 billion in 1996 as compared to a smaller real increase of imports of $5 billion);
2) A 33.6% export growth to Canada from 1993-96;
3) A rapid recovery from the 1995 Mexican Economic crisis;
4) A creation of 90,000 to 160,00 jobs involved in the export industry to Mexico; and
5) Sourcing Mexican apparel products comprised of two-thirds U.S. content (as opposed
to getting similar products from Asia).
Aslam, supra note 118. In addition, another source of support for the NAFTA and its success has
come from a study sponsored by the Council of the Americas. Overview: NAFTA impact on
Texas, California, MEx. Bus. MoNTHLY, Apr. 1, 1997. This study noted that exports from both
Texas and California have risen by 15% under the NAFTA. Id.
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American trade interests that differ sharply from those of the United States. 129 These
diverging interests are demonstrated by Mercosur's treatment ofi telecommunications sys-
tems; media ownership; and participation in financial services; as well as bidding on gov-
ernment procurement contracts to Mercosur nationals. 130 Indeed, these restrictions
granted to Mercosur members coincide with areas in which U.S companies have an inter-
national competitive advantage. 31 Thus, the inevitable Free Trade Area of the Americas of
the future may actually lack "the type of market liberalization rules that benefit the most
dynamic sectors of the U.S. economy."132 This realization is even more compelling since
Mercosur proposed to increase nonmember import tariffs by 25 percent,13
3 which could
reverse hemispheric free trade. 134
Nonetheless, the question of whether the gradual enlargement of the NAFTA will
someday result in the Free Trade of the Americas is by no means certain- it is more likely
that the FTAA will result from a Mercosur led building blocks approach. 135 Indeed, Brazil,
not the United States, is currently headlining the direction of the FTAA, due to inaction by
the U.S. 136 More importantly, recent Chilean attitude toward the NAFTA has shifted.
13 7
This attitude change toward the United States stems from trade disputes involving Salmon
and a recent court decision on timber products. 138
D. THE UNITED STATES' PRESENT ECONOMIC STRENGTHS SHOULD BE PUT TO GOOD USE.
The United States should not falter in furthering our economy at a time when world
agricultural exports grew from over $200 billion in 1980 to over $400 billion in the mid
129. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41.
130. Id.
131. Id Mercosur, however, has built impossibly high trade barriers, making its markets inaccessible
to products such as motor vehicles and heavy machinery. Mercosur Under Siege, J. CoM., Oct. 31,
1996, at A6. Furthermore, Mercosur is becoming less competitive internationally, because by
eliminating the flow of trade from the most efficient outsiders to each other, it has effectively lost
competitive pressures on domestic producers. Id.
132. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond& Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41.
133. Hemisphere Closing Down, J. CoM., Nov. 14,1997, at A6.
134. Id.
135. Mercosur Approach to FTAA Advances; US. Partners in NAFTA Seek "Four-Plus-One" Deals, LATIN
AM. WKLY. REP., Aug. 5, 1997, at 364.
136. Dusseau, supra note 2.
137. Mercosur Approach to FTAA Advances: U.S. Partners in NAFTA Seek "Four-Plus-One" Deals, supra
note 135. Jose Miquel Insulza, Chilean Foreign Minister, stated that "Mercosur is our FTA," and
commented that Chile is focusing on complete integration with Mercosur, an interest supersed-
ing any interest Chile may have in a deal with the NAFTA. Id.
138. Id. Further complicating the US-Chile relationship is the dreadful "poisoned grapes" fiasco of
1989, an event which cost Chile approximately $300 million dollars. Id.
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1990's. 139 Agriculture is a promising area for the United States because its agricultural
exports increased three-fold over domestic consumption, 140 allowing yield growth and
total demand to remain at the same pace. 14 1 Furthermore, agricultural exports increased
from 18 to 30 percent of gross farm cash receipts, respectively, from 1986 to 1996.142 In
addition, the agricultural industry is two times more reliant on foreign trade than the
economy as a whole. 143
Although opportunities abound in this area, world markets are heavily subsidized and
protected. 44 U.S. inclusion into these markets, however, is supplanted by preferential
trade blocks like Mercosur and bilateral trade agreements like the Canada-Chile agree-
ment. Both of these agreements put national producers at a disadvantage by providing
preferential duty access to member's markets. 145 For example, U.S. agricultural products
bound to Chile face an 11 percent tariff.146 Again, in this context, failure to provide fast-
track authority undermines growth in this country's agricultural exports, as well as the
well being of its ranchers and farmers. 147 This is especially poignant since the largest U.S.
agricultural trade surplus occurred in 1996.148
Another example of how U.S. products are not able to compete in the Latin American
markets is in the wine industry. For example, American wine producers are not able to
maintain a competitive share in the Venezuelan market because Chile has a bilateral trade
139. Prepared Testimony of Keith Collins, Chief Economist U.S. Dept. of Agriculture before the House
Agriculture Comm.; General Farm Commodities Subcommittee, FED. NEws SERv., Oct. 9, 1997. In
addition, the labor department in November announced a 24 year low unemployment figure of
4.7%. Glassman, supra note 25. The U.S. economy, furthermore, is the strongest in the world
with inflation of a mere 2% and growth of 4%. Id. In addition, not only is industrial employ-




142. Economic Research Service Agricultural Outlook-Part II ofIII, supra note 9.
143. Prepared Testimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairman and CEO of TRW, Inc., Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade, supra note 5. 1996 alone saw record exports totaling $60
billion (an increase of 7% from 1995 and 50% from 1990). Id. This figure amounts to one of
every three farm acres including 50% of wheat, 57% of rice, and 37% of soybean acres. Id.
144. Prepared Testimony of Keith Collins, Chief Economist, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture before the House
Agriculture Comm.; General Farm Commodities Subcomm., supra note 139.
145. Id.
146. Economic Research Service: Agricultural outlook-Part I of I7, supra note 9.
147. Prepared Testimony of Keith Collins, Chief Economism U.S. Dept. of Agriculture before the House
Agriculture Comm.; General Farm Commodities Subcomm., supra note 139.
148. Prepared Testimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairman and CEO of TRW, Inc-, Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade, supra note 5. The agricultural trade surplus for 1996
was $28 billion. Id. Among the trade concerns that the United States will have to negotiate
include: 1) High tariffs, 2) Tariff-rate quotas; 3) Export subsidies; 4) Domestic support; 5) State
trading, sanitary and phytosanitary barriers; and 6) Regional trade agreements. Economic
Research Service: Agricultural Outlook-Part 11 of HI, supra note 9. Indeed, fast-track is needed to
effectively and efficiently negotiate such a wide range of factors. Id.
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agreement with Venezuela and the U.S. does not.149 This agreement allows Chilean wine
to enter tariff free, while their American counterparts must pay a 20 percent duty.I5 0
Elimination of this tariff could lead to a market share increase from the current 5 percent
to over 30 percent. 151
Thus, it is clear that opening trade relations with Latin American markets (like Chile)
is important not only for mutual gain, but to compete on a level playing field.152 The pre-
ceding does not consider the weakening effects to the U.S. mining industry due to the
Canada-Chile bilateral free trade agreement that gives preferential treatment to Canadian
mining firms.153 In conclusion, since Mercosur clearly has a momentum that the NAFTA
does not, 154 at the next hemispheric trade meeting in 1998 the Mercosur led South
American Free Trade Agreement will have formidable negotiating strength against the
United States. 155
E. PRESENT CHILEAN ATTITUDE TowARD TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES.
Although abundant, Latin American reactions to the 1994 Miami Summit were var-
ied. 156 For example, reactions to the Summit included emphasizing protection at home in
order to enhance a strong negotiating position against the United States.157 As previously
stated, by forming regional trade blocs, Latin American states provided the means to easily
promote hemispheric integration. 158 This is true even though a negative effect of the
149. Schumacher, supra note 34.
150. Id. Another of the seemingly endless examples includes IMC-Agrico Co, a Florida business,
which lost a phosphate fertilizer contract thanks to Chile's bilateral trade agreement with Mexico.
Bryant, supra note 12.
151. Schumacher, supra note 34.
152. The White House: Fact Sheet-U.S. & Chile Trade Relations, M2 PRESSwIRm, Feb. 27, 1997. U.S.
exports to Chile in 1996 totaled $4.1 billion, while imports comprised $2.26 billion for a trade
deficit for Chile to the amount of $1.9 billion. Id.
153. Kevin Hall, Clinton to Get an Earful on Visit to Latin America, J. CoMM., Oct. 10, 1997, at IA.
154. U.S. Trade Policy In Latin America, LATIN AM. REG'L REP.: Max. & NAFTA REP., June 3, 1997, at 1.
Intra-Mercosur trade has exhibited strong growth-from U.S.$4.1 billion in 1990 to U.S.$16.8
billion in 1996. U.S. Policy Takes a Drubbing, Chile &- Argentina Provide Counter to NAFTA Repor,
supra note 94. In the same period, trade with non-members increased from U.S.$67.4 billion to
U.S.$124 billion. Id. Under the NAFTA, on the other hand, American companies increased their
exports to Mexico by 35.7%. Overview: Thumbs Up, Down For NAFTA, MEx. Bus. Mo., Aug. 1,
1997.
155. Id. Brazil, however, has threatened its Mercosur partners by adopting unilateral measures on at
least five occasions. Andean Community Update Mercosur Developments, and Progress Toward a
Free Trade Area of the Americas, LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP., May 31, 1997. Brazil's faltering econo-
my has furthered such moves. However, although a devaluation of the Real could alleviate its
problems, Mercosur members are sure to oppose such a move because their export deals to Brazil
would not be as profitable. Id,
156. Sebastian Edwards, The Americas: NAFTA Offers Latins Little They Can't Have Now, WALL ST. J.,
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trade bloc may be trade diversion.159 Nevertheless, these associations further a crucial step
in the consolidation and maintenance of democratic systems. 160 Thus, Latin Americans
are reluctant to open their markets to the NAFTA on U.S. terms because they believe that a
concomitant export advantage against the United States cannot be materialized. 161 This
reluctance is due to the fact that these economies do not want exposure to market integra-
tion with the more sophisticated and dynamic North American economies. 162
It is in this environment that Chilean policy-makers became obsessed with NAFTA
accession. 163 As a result, Chile did little to open their economy to the world.164 All of this
is a backdrop to the fact that NAFTA accession cannot be shown to be the preferable route
for Chilean interests, which may be advanced by other means. 165 Furthermore, with
annual growth of 7 percent, Chile is in a strong economic position with or without the
NAFTA. 166 Moreover, with trade as the cornerstone of the Chilean economy, Chile has
unprecedented strength due to sweeping economic and government reforms. 167 In addi-
tion, Chilean government officials have expressed a stronger interest in developing free
trade across the Americas than in developing the interests of South America's Mercosur
customs union. 16 8
In this context, the Chilean Finance Minister, Eduardo Aninat, demonstrated past
160. FTAA to be associated historically with Clinton, supra note 125. This effect was tested last year by
the pressure exerted by Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay to attenuate the threat of a Paraguayan
coup d'etat. Id.
161. Valente, supra note 85.
162. Id.
163. Edwards, supra note 156.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Kevin G. Hall, When It Comes to Trade, Chile Makes the Grade, J. CoM., Feb. 26, 1997, at 3A.
167. James Welsh, Investing in Latin American Markets, WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1997, at 104-08. The
result has been a significant reduction of Chilean government intervention with business, result-
ing in modest non-tariff barriers, as well as an imported goods tariff of 6%. Id. However, even a
relatively small tariff is significant to success or failure in foreign markets. Prepared Testimony of
Joseph Gorman, Chairman and CEO of TRW, Ina, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means;
Subcomm. on Trade, supra note 5.
168. Chile Spurns Mercosur, Seeks Americas Free Trade; REUTERS FIN. SERV., May 12, 1997. Indeed,
Mercosur membership has not been welcomed by all sectors of Chilean business-namely the
agricultural industry. Rejected by NAFTA, Frei Pursues Deal With Mercosur Bloc LAIN AM. INFO.
SEv., Mar. 1, 1996. In 1995, meat and rice constituted 30% Uruguay's exports to Chile; con-
comitantly soy and meat products accounted for up to 53% of Paraguay's exports to Chile. Id.
Similarly, Argentina's meat accounted for exports to Chile of $104 million in 1995. Id. Yet, U.S.
Congress' October 1995 refusal to fast-track the proposed expansion of the NAFrA was a deter-
mining factor in Chile's pact with the Mercosur. Gustavo Gonzalez, Economy Chile: Integration
with Latin America's Most Dynamic Bloc, INTER PRESS SERV., Sept. 30, 1996.
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confidence in the eventual Chilean accession to the NAFTA.1 69 Presently, Chile has suc-
cessfully negotiated bilateral trade agreements with two-thirds of the NAFTA triad, and at
least in the short run, is more likely to join the Asian-based APEC than the NAFTA.1 70 In
addition, Chile may choose to strengthen its ties with Mexico, Canada, Mercosur, or other
nation states, 17 1 as it has done with Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.1 72 The pre-
ceding is more poignant since the United States only imports 15 percent of Chile's
exports. 173 Most of this figure is made up of copper, which the United States will buy any-
way.174 Furthermore, Chile will not expect any gains from the export of manufactured
goods to the United States, as does Mexico. 175 Chile is primarily interested in the trade of
fish and wants it as a prominent part of any trade agreement. 17 6
Nonetheless, Chile and the United States have tensions that need to be addressed. For
example, Argentina's accession as U.S. special ally produced some tension between Chile
and the United States.177 In general, however, Chilean sentiment toward the United States
centers on a "change of U.S. protectionist policy' 178 These protectionist policies are
argued to run counter to cooperation and hemispheric integration programs. 179
169. Chile Spurns Mercosur, Seeks Americas Free Trade, supra note 168. The White House's present
position on Chilean accession to the NAFTA, or the development of separate negotiations with
Chile is as follows,"[in o]ur discussions with Chile over the last year or two, we have indicated
that we might be interested in a bilateral arrangement, much as Canada did a bilateral arrange-
ment with Chile. I don't think there's any final decision on that yet, but that possibility hs cer-
tainly been discussed, discussed quite seriously, and I think it's one to which the Chileans are
amenable." The White House: Press Briefing by M, McCurry and Dan Taruflo, M2 PREsswIRa, Sept.
18, 1997. According to chapter 22 of the NAFTA: "[any country or group of countries may
accede to this Agreement subject to such terms and conditions as may be agreed between such
country or countries and the Commission and following approval in accordance with the applic-
able legal procedures of each country" North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12,
1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605,702 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
170. Dusseau, supra note 2. Santiago, Chile, is poised to become an international financial center by
taking advantage of its of its geographical location as a "bridge" between Mercosur and the Asian
markets. Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile: Santiago Seeks Mercosur Role as Bridge to Asia Pacific.,
INTERPREmS SERV., Aug. 5, 1997.
171. Gantz, supra note 39, at 408.
172. Slow Track to Fast-Track; Clinton Administration's Push for Fast-Track Authorization of Trade





177. Chile-U.S. Trade Pact Nears Signing, INT1RPRESS SE., Aug. 21, 1997. President Clinton conferred
to Argentina the status of "non-NATO military ally" (NNMA) during his Latin America visit in
October 1997. The White House, Press Briefing by Counsel to President, Mack McLarty on
President's Trip to South America, M2 PR&%SWIRE, Oct. 13, 1997. Although this partnership is cate-
gorized in terms of common interest in peacekeeping, Chileans expressed some concern about it.
Id.
178. Gustavo Gonzalez, Trade: Chilean Right Demands End to U.S. Protectionism., INTERPREss SERV.,
Aug. 5, 1997.
179. Id.
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Accordingly, the Chilean president stated that the 1998 Summit of the Americas is meant
primarily to initiate formal negotiations on the FTAA. 180 In addition, Chilean entrepre-
neurs are looking toward Mercosur to present a "united front against U.S. protection-
ism.'1 8  Thus, President Frei stated that the 1998 negotiations "must include, from the
very start, the issues of most interest to our countries, and not only the agenda that the
United States wishes to impose!"182 Furthermore, even though a future bilateral trade
agreement could include crucial environmental provisions, these must reflect Chilean
standards-not those of the United States.183 In addition, these provisions must not be
enforced with trade sanctions. 184
Recently, other tensions threatened the U.S.-Chile trading relationship. A primary
tension is an early June 1997 California court ruling barring imports of timber from Chile
on "sanitary grounds.?185 Subsequently, Portland port authorities unjustifiably refused
entry to Chilean timber actually not affected by the ban. 186 This controversy began in a
San Francisco U.S. District Court by the issuing of an injunction forcing the Department
of Agriculture to develop new rules and a new environmental impact statement.187 This
injunction effectively barred the Department of Agriculture from issuing new permits for
most foreign imports, exclusive of both Canada and Mexico, as well as tropical imports not
considered to pose pest risks. 188 Nonetheless, the Chilean Foreign Minister Jose Miguel
Insulza optimistically stated that this controversy will not lead to curbs on Chilean
Lumber.189
In addition, Chilean attitudes were further soured by a complaint filed by U.S salmon
producers against Chilean salmon exporters for dumping.' 90 However, Insulza catego-
rized this problem as being at an early stage and downplayed its importance.19 1 The atti-
tude in Chile went so far as the President of the Industrialist Association suggesting that,
180. Frederico Ferber, Mercosur: Landmark Accord on Political Coordination Mechanism, INTERPRESS
SERv., June 19, 1997.
181. Gustavo Gonzalez, Americas: U.S. Protectionism Undermines FTAA, INTERPRESS SERV., July 15,
1997.
182. Ferber, supra note 180.
183. Slow track to fast-track; Clinton Administration's Push for Fast-Track Authorization of Trade Deals,
supra note 86.
184. Id.
185. U.S. Policy Takes a Drubbing Chile & Argentina Provide Counter to NAFTA Report, supra note
94.
186. Id. The U.S. imports 13% of all of Chile's timber exports. Id.
187. Hal Bernton, Judges Ruling Blocks Most New Permits for Log Imports, PORAND OREGONIAN, June
11, 1997.
188. Id.
189. Richard Lawrence, Chile Open to Bilateral Pact, But Prefers NAFTA, J. CoM., Sept. 19, 1997.
190. U.S. Policy Takes a Drubbing Chile 6- Argentina Provide Counter to NAFTA Report supra note 94.
The United States imports 55% of all Chilean salmon exports. Id The complaint was filed by
salmon farmers charging that Chile was undercutting their prices by as much as 40% by subsidiz-
ing salmon exports. Market Notes: Chile-Anti-Dumping Complaint Filed Against Chile, LATIN Am.
L. & Bus. REP., July 31, 1997.
191. Lawrence, supra note 189.
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unless this dispute were satisfactorily resolved, Chile's plan to purchase fighter jets would
be called off.192
Thus, present Chilean attitude toward the NAFTA can be best classified as distinctively
hostile. 193 All of this just when Chile was finally beginning to leave the "poisoned" grape
incident behind. 194 This refers to the cyanide laced grape incident of 1989, which was
wrongly incited by U.S. Health and Safety inspectors. 195 This mistake effectively destroyed
the Chilean grapes industry and its exports for a year.196 In conclusion, all of these inci-
dents have "bred mistrust of Washington as a NAFTA partner." 197
II. How Mercosur and NAFTA's Approach to Trade Are Inherently
Divergent.
A. INTRODUCTION.
The basic goals of Mercosur and the NAFTA are for the most part incompatible. 198
The NAFTA was designed to facilitate the free movement of capital and services among its
member states. 199 In addition, the stated objectives of the NAFTA include the elimination
of both tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in, and the facilitation of cross border move-
ment of goods and services between its members. 200 Furthermore, the NAFTA seeks to
increase investment opportunities, promote fair competition within the area, and to effec-
tively provide not only protection, but also enforcement of, intellectual property rights.20'
On the other hand, Mercosur was patterned after the European Union, including a
Common External Tariff (CET) and coordinated macro-economic and sectoral poli-
cies.202 It seeks coordinated macro-economic policies on foreign trade, agriculture, indus-
try, capital, services, customs, transportation, communication, and fiscal, monetary, and
exchange policies.20 3 These lofty goals, however, have been hard to implement due to dif-
192. Slow Track to Fast- Track; Clinton Administration's Push for Fast- Track Authorization of Trade
Deals, supra note 86.





198. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 308. The stated objectives of the NAFIA include the elimination of
both tariff and non-tariff barrier to trade in, and facilitating cross border movement of goods
and services between its members. Id. at 307. Furthermore, the NAFTA seeks to increase invest-
ment opportunities, to promote fair competition within the area, and to effectively provide pro-
tection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Id.
199. Id. at 308 (i.e. a free trade area). Not only does the NAFTA ignore immigration issues, but except
for computer products, it also fails to deal with a CET. Id.
200. Id. at 307.
201. Id.
202. See Abbott & Bowman, supra note 4, at 499.
203. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 308.
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ferences in macroeconomic policy, trade imbalances, and other disagreements.204 Yet, by
the time the NAFTA is fully implemented at the beginning of the new millennium,
Mercosur will be a free trade area with a partial CET.205 However, there is no reason
Mercosur, as a customs union, would be proscribed from entering into a free trade agree-
ment with the NAFTA member states as a step in the eventual formation of the FTAA.206
Mercosur's effectiveness, however, has not gone unquestioned. 207 Specifically, it is
alleged that the very products showing the most promising export growth within
Mercosur are the same products Mercosur members demonstrated an inability to export
competitively outside the region. 20 8 This evidence mostly focuses on the rapid increase in
intra-regional export in the capital-intensive auto industry.209 Of course, other commen-
tators classify Mercosur as different from previous regional arrangements that attempted
to protect internal industries and to isolate economies from outside competition. 2 10 The
pundits claim, however, that this means "the regional orientation of exports is growing
most rapidly for products where there is no evidence that Mercosur has any natural com-
parative advantage:' 211 Thus, Mercosur is accused of distorting trade.2 12
Others argue, that since Mercosur's inception its trading partners successfully
increased their sales to the region at comparable levels to Mercosur members. 21 3
Furthermore, intra Mercosur trade is lauded as very significant and normal for economi-
cally strong countries like Brazil and Argentina, in which trade was significantly attenuated
prior to the Mercosur agreement due to high tariffs.214 Furthermore, since Mercosur's
duty-free treatment of automobiles will not be applied until the year 2000, "it is not
because of Mercosur, but rather in spite of it, that the intra Mercosur trade in automobiles
has boomed in recent years. '2 15
However, outside the debate surrounding fast-track, it is possible that the NAFTA's pre-
sent structure is too complex to expand to large groups of additional state parties.216 It was
204. See Abbott & Bowman, supra note 4, at 499. Furthermore, by the target date of December, 31,
1994, none of these goals had been accomplished. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 308. By this date, a
CET was in existence for only about 85% of the items found in Mercosur's nomenclature. Id. In
addition, intra-regional free trade was present for only about 90% of the harmonized tariff
schedule. Id. Post-Mercosur agreements between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
delayed implementation of the intra-regional free trade area respectively until 1999 and 2000. Id.
Furthermore, the implementation of the Common External Tariff was also postponed until at
least 2006. Id.
205. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 309.
206. Id.
207. Stephen Fidler, Is Mercosur Protectionist?, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at 3. See generally, THE
ECONOMICS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya eds.,
1996).
208. Fidler, supra note 207.
209. Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Which Mercosur?, LATINFINANCE, Jan. 11, 1997, at 70.
210. Id.
211. Fidler, supra note 207, at 3.
212. Id.
213. Mendoza, supra note 209, at 70.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Gantz, supra note 39, at 401.
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suggested by the Canadian Trade Minister, Art Eggelton, that "these two agreements have
fundamentally different objectives and could not be merged without one or the other dis-
pensing with its core objectives."217 First, along with labor and environmental issues unpop-
ular with Latin American nations, NAFTA membership includes more than twelve different
tariff phase-out schedules. 2 18 In addition, the NAFTA has a complex set of rules of origin, as
well as many schedules for the phasing out of market access for services.219 This complexity
is not overwhelming in terms of the present three-member NAFTA, however, this level of
complexity applied to a NAFTA comprised of many members seems a stretch.220
B. A COMPARISON BETWEEN MERCOSUR AND THE NAFrA.
The primary difference between Mercosur and the NAFTA is that one is a free trade
area and the other is a customs union. The NAFTA became effective on January 1, 1994,
and is a free trade area in which no tariffs or quotas are imposed on goods originating in
and traded among the member states.221 On the other hand, while a custom union also
eliminates tariffs and quotas, it applies a common external tariff applicable to goods origi-
nating from nonmember states.
2 2 2
Mercosur was originally conceived as a bilateral common market between Argentina
and Brazil to be incorporated into the ALADI. 223 In the end, the Mercosur treaty was
signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay on March 26, 1991.224 Generally, its
stated objectives include the elimination of trade barriers, the establishment of a common
external tariff, coordination of macroeconomic policies, and harmonization of laws.225
This treaty was officially implemented by the "Protocol of Ouro Preto" by the member
states on December 17, 1994.226
To benefit from the NAFTAs free trade framework, goods must be completely pro-
duced or wholly obtained in and with materials originating from any of the member
states.227 Nonetheless, a nonqualified good may meet a regional value content.228 In
contrast to these incomprehensible content measurements, Mercosur's approach involves
217. Id at 404.




221. Mariana C. Silveira, Rules of Origin in International Trade Treaties: Toward the FTAA, 14 ARIz. J.
INT'L & COMP. L.411 (1997).
222. Id. at 411.
223. See Abbott & Bowman, supra note 4, at 498.
224. See Treaty Establishing a Common Market Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter"Mercosur"].
225. Id. at 1044-45.
226. Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur, Dec.
17, 1994,Arg. Braz.-Para.-Uru., 34 1L.M. 1244 (1995).
227. NAFTA, supra note 169, at arts. 401,415.
228. Id. at arts. 402,(2)-(3). Goods not meeting a shift in tariff classification may nonetheless qualify
for duty-free status if the regional value content requirement is met Id. This content must be at
least 60% under the transactional-value method, or at least 50% under the net-cost method.
O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 309. Note that some products, like motor vehicles and automotive
parts, must be valued per the net-cost method. Id.
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a simple determination that the good must originate or be produced from components
originating within Mercosur.229 Mercosur's rules of origin are simpler because the bloc
intends to become a customs union by 2006, thus the need for rules of origin will be
moot.2
30
In addition, a .complex system of rules of origin arguably discriminate in favor of
countries like the United States or Canada. 23 1 This discrimination is due to of the com-
plexity in demonstrating compliance, for which countries like Canada and the United
States have the sophistication and resources to assure that only qualifying goods receive the
benefits of the NAFTA.232 This is a luxury that countries of more meager resources can-
not afford. 233 However, the Mercosur signatories, Chile, and Bolivia agreed to set up a
joint electronic customs system to reduce transshipment fraud.234 Nevertheless, the rules
of origin espoused by the NAFTA are condemned as a trade obstacle that implies "buy
North American, or else... '235 In addition, valuation and classification is complex and
expensive for companies, forcing them to pay the U.S. tariff of 2.5 percent, for example, in
automobiles, rather than to evaluate the North American value-added content.236 On the
other hand, the rules of origin under Mercosur are both more liberal and less
complicated. 237 For example, Mercosur's common external tariff eliminates most prob-
lems associated with transshipment of goods.238
229. See Mercosur, supra note 224, at 1054-58. In the alternative, to qualify, a good must be substan-
tially transformed within Mercosur to qualify. Id
230. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 310. This is because all foreign imports will be charged uniform duties
upon entrance to Mercosur and then the goods will be able to move around duty free throughout
the customs union. Id.
231. Silveira, supra note 221, at 453.
232. Id.
233. Gantz, supra note 39, at 401.
234. Customs, LATIN AM. REG'L REP.: MExico AND NAFTA REP., Oct. 21,1997, at 4. Argentina estimated
that this type of transshipment fraud by evasion of the Value Added Tax is costing them U.S. $21
billion in lost revenues. Id.
235. Silveira, supra note 223, at 448.
236. Id. at 449. Television manufacturers could also prefer to pay a 5% tariff to trace the value added
content. Id.
237. Gantz, supra note 39, at 402.
238. Id. As an illustrative example, an exporter wanting to circumvent a higher import tariff to Mexico
of 15% could first import the goods into the United States which has a 5% tariff, and subse-
quently transship the goods to Mexico, a strategy which is taken care of by a system like the
NAFTA. Id. at n. 134. A customs union like Mercosur eliminates the financial incentive to trans-
ship since all members share an equal external tariff. I&. at 402.
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As the United states lags further in passing fast-track, the rules of origin and local con-
tent requirement provide disincentive to purchase U.S. goods. 239 To benefit from
Mercosur's tariff reduction by meeting local content requirements, world companies will
no longer desire U.S. parts or components-these will come from Mercosur member
states, will result in the loss of U.S. jobs and a strain on the economy.240
In the context of the future FTAA, because the NAFTA has no CET, the lack of high
content requirements will allow nonmember countries to export components for assembly
to the NAFTA country levying the lowest tariff on semi-finished goods. Subsequently,
nonmember countries can use that country to access the other members, thereby evading
higher external tariffs.24 1 Thus, in the context of the FTAA, if the NAFTA's rule mecha-
nism is adopted to comply with those stricter regional content requirements,
Mercosurmembers will be forced to switch present input sourcing from cheaper and high-
er quality European and Asian sources to North American input sourcing. 242 This switch
leads to trade diversion, in direct opposition to WTO mandates.243 In general, the senti-
ment of many Latin American nations is that even under a banner of collective action,
environmental and labor strings will not be accepted.244
Legally conforming the NAFTA and Mercosur is a formidable task for many rea-
sons. 245 Thus, replication of the NAFTA modeling for rules of origin will not realistically
be replicated in a trade agreement encompassing the entire hemisphere. 246 For example,
unlike NAFTA members, who are free to set their own external tariffs, Mercosur's custom
union applies a uniform common external tariff to all imports from nonmembers.
247 In
addition, the NAFTA, as opposed to Mercosur, incorporates a comprehensive set of invest-
ment protections like binding arbitration procedures between host country and foreign
investors. 248 With the exception of Chile, which accepted a similar concession in its bilat-
eral trade agreement with Canada, many Latin American nations will be reluctant to
accept binding investment dispute international arbitration.249 Specifically, the two agree-
ments differ greatly in the manner they entertain the following:
239. Prepared Testimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairman and CEO of TRW, Inc., Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade, supra note 5.
240. Id.
241. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 310.
242, Id.
243. Silveira, supra note 221, at 453.
244. Carol Stump, Free Trade Area of the Americas, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 153, 157 (1995).
245. Gantz, supra note 39, at 403.
246. Silveira, supra note 221, at 453.
247. Gantz, supra note 39, at 402. A common external market is not outside the reach of NAFTA
members, but due to GATT's mandate of avoiding increases of duties, this must require Canada
and Mexico to reduce their import duties. At a post-Uruguay Round level, U.S. tariffs of 3.5%
will still be substantially lower that any other nation in the hemisphere. Id.
248. Id. at 403.
249. Id. Argentina, which has a similar provision to Chapter 11 of NAFTA in its bilateral investment
agreement with the United States, will not have reason to disagree with international arbitration
of investment disputes. Id
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1. Government Procurement.
Mercosur does not deal with market access to government entities for foreign sellers,
i.e., government procurement.250 The NAFTA, on the other hand, provides for proce-
dures through which companies from one member can bid for federal government pro-
curement contracts for services or goods in the other two signatories.25 1 In addition, a
bidder is not required to purchase local supplies.252 Finally, the NAFTA accordingly allows
for an independent review of the bidding process through a guaranteed bid challenge
mechanism.253
Mercosur, on the other hand, is silent on access to government procurement con-
tracts. 254 For example, Brazil, the dominant member of Mercosur, retained a provision
reserving the right to discriminate in favor of its nationals in these types of contracts.
255
Furthermore, 1994 Brazilian legislation allows the Brazilian Government and "para-statal"
entities the right to discriminate in favor of either domestic companies or foreign compa-
nies operating in Brazil.256 These kinds of self-interest laws that attenuate access to gov-
ernment procurement contracts will likely be a roadblock to a possible incorporation of
Mercosur and NAFTA ideals.257
2. Financial Services.
Mercosur generally does not deal with financial services. 258 Under the NAFTA, finan-
cial service providers may set up business and serve dients from another member state on
an equal level to that granted domestic firms. 259 Indeed, most-favored-nation treatment is
accorded to member nations.260 A member is not required to permit nonresident finan-
cial firms to do business or to solicit clients within its territory, however, the member state
may not proscribe its citizens from using any firm they choose.261 Mercosur's take on
financial services involves private investors' capability to purchase and trade listed stock
from the other Mercosur member states.
262
250. Id. at 403-04.
251. NAFTA, supra note 169, at art. 1003.
252. Id.
253. Id. at art. 1017.
254. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 311.
255. Id.
256. Id. These laws apply to telecommunication, computer, software and digital equipment and ser-
vices. Id.
257. Id.
258. Gantz, supra note 39, at 404.
259. NAFTA, supra note 169, at arts. 1403, 1405.
260. Id. at art. 1406.
261. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 312.
262. Id. This concession by Brazil is significant because it limits the purchase and sale of stock listed in
its trade exchanges by foreigners to institutional investors. Id. Minimal standards as to the offer-
ing of publicly traded stock by regional companies, as well as common rules on mutual funds
and stock exchange operation, were also agreed upon in August 1993. Id.
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3. Telecommunications.
While Mercosur fails to address telecommunications, 263 NAFTA members enjoy
open telecommunication transport networks and services. 264 In addition, all licensing,
permit registration, and notification procedures must be "transparent and non-discrimi-
natory."265 Furthermore, applications filed thereunder must be processed expeditious-
ly.266 Although the NAFTA allows monopolies to freely operate in providing public
telecommunications transport network or services, a monopoly may not abuse its position
by attenuating competition through cross-subsidization or predatory conduct.26 7
Furthermore, discriminatory access to otherwise public telecommunication transport ser-
vices or networks is prohibited.268
On the other hand, Mercosur all but ignores the telecommunications sector.269 The
off limits mentality is pervasive in Mercosur members, since the telecommunications sec-
tor has traditionally been limited to domestic control.270 Therefore, considering the
United States competitive advantage, it is highly unlikely that any concessions will be given
by Mercosur to open up this field. 27 1
4. Intellectual Property.
The NAFTA deals extensively with intellectual property, while the Mercosur agreement
fails to address a regime for these rights.272 The NAFTA is heavily involved in the protection
of copyrights, trademarks, and patents. 273 Not only must the member states provide
enforcement of these rights in their territory, the members must also protect against the
enforcement becoming a restraint to legitimate trade.274
The NAFTA further requires the protection of encrypted program-carrying satellite
signals and lay-out designs of semiconductor integrated circuits. 275 The NAFTA also
requires the protection of trade secrets and industrial designs. 276 In addition, members
263. Gantz, supra note 39, at 404.
264. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 311.
265. NAFrA, supra note 169, at art. 1303.
266. Id. at art. 1303.
267. Id. at art. 1305.
268. Id.
269. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 311.
270. Id.
271. IaL at 312.
272. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 6, at 804.
273. NAFTA, supra note 169, at arts. 1705, 1708, 1709.
274. Id. at art. 1701 (2). Furthermore, each member state has had to ratify the following: (1) the 1971
Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized
Duplication of their Phonographs; (2) the 1971 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works; (3) the 1967 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; and
(4) either the 1978 (UPOV Convention) International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants, or the 1991 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants. I&.
275. Id. at arts. 1707 and 1710.
276. Id. at arts. 1711 and 1713.
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must ensure that procedures are established so that intellectual property rights are enforce-
able under both civil and criminal law.277 Finally, members must permit the national cus-
toms services to be used as enforcers of these rights by detaining counterfeit trademark or
pirated copyright goods at border checks. 278
In contrast, harmonization of intellectual property standards within the Mercosur
members is tentative. 279 This agreement has been mostly concerned with trademarks;
however, these measures have not been ratified by any member state other than Brazil. 280
This is primarily due to marked differences in the way the member nations' macroeco-
nomic policies, intellectual property laws, and infrastructure in the governing bodies are
charged with the enforcement of laws.281
Because of this wide chasm in the treatment of intellectual property, it is almost cer-
tain this area will be extremely hard to resolve.282 Yet, Mercosur's involvement in the Paris
Convention, the Berne Convention, and the individual members' adoption of the TRIPS
agreement is promising. 283 Nonetheless, this issue is hard to resolve primarily because
Latin Americans view intellectual property protection as attempts by the have nations to
keep the have not nations both dependent on the first world for technology and in an
underdeveloped state.284
5. Dispute Resolution.
Mercosur lacks the NAFTAs extensive level of government to government dispute res-
olution.285 Nevertheless, recent agreements complemented Mercosur with both private
party as well as government dispute resolution.286 However, settling disputes in the areas
of countervailing duty and anti-dumping actions differ greatly in Mercosur and the
NAFTA. 287 In the NAFTA negotiations, the United States was recalcitrant in not eliminat-
ing unfair trade actions or, to a lesser degree, according more lenient rules to NAFTA
members.288 Furthermore, Mercosur fails to deal directly with intra-regional unfair trade
disputes and Mercosur, along with Mexico and Canada, will want a bar to anti-dumping
actions against duty free regionally made goods.289
277. Id. at arts. 1715 and 1717.
278. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 313.
279. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 6, at 801.
280. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 313.
281. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 6, at 801.
282. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 314.
283. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 6, at 803.
284. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 314.
285. Gantz, supra note 39, at 403.
286. See, eg., Protocol of Buenos Aires on International Jurisdiction in Disputes Relating to Contracts,
Sept., 1997, Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay, 36 LLM. 1263 (1997); Protocol of Brasilia for
the Settlement of Disputes, May, 1997, Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay, 36 I.L.M. 691
(1997).
287. Gantz, supra note 39, at 404.
288. Id. NAFTA treatment is procedural, allowing review by binational arbitral panels instead of
national courts. However, the substantive law of the importing country applies. Id.
289. Id. This contention should be perfectly acceptable to the United States since price discrimination
is the primary reason for dumping, and this practice would be moot when no barriers to trade
exist. Id.
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III. What Is the Effect of Chile's Associate Membership in Mercosur and
its Promised "Most Favored Trade Bloc" as it Relates to NAFTA
Accession.
On June 26, 1996, the day Chile committed itself to associate level membership in
Mercosur, NAFTA expansion into South America became next to impossible. 290 Chile's
official association with the Mercosur nations became effective on October 1, 1996.291
Article 52 states:
The contracting party that grants advantages, favors, perks, immunities or privi-
leges to products native from or destined to another member country or not
member of the ALADI, for decisions or agreements that are not foreseen in the
treaty of Montevideo 1980 must: (a) Inform to the other contracting parties
within a term of fifteen (15) days of subscribing to the agreement, accompanied
by the text of the same and their complementary instruments; (b) Announce the
disposition to negotiate within a term of ninety (90) days, equivalent concessions
to those granted and received in a global manner; (c) In case of not arriving to a
solution mutually satisfactory in the negotiations foreseen in the literal b., the
parties will negotiate equivalent compensations, in a term of ninety (90) days; (d)
If an agreement in the negotiations established in the literal c. is not achieved, the
affected party will appeal to the procedure of solution of effective controversies in
the instant agreement 292
Chile seems bound to Mercosur. In essence, this article requires Chile to negotiate
equivalent compensation to Mercosur members. Thus, Chile is accountable to Mercosur
for concessions to the NAFTA or any other third party nation.293 The reality of this provi-
sion is presently being felt by Chile, since it is currently under attack by Mercosur demand-
290. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41.
291. Gantz, supra note 39, at 400.
292. Acuerdo Mercosur-Chile, <http://www.intr.net/mercosur/chiacue.htm.> (author's translation).
In the original Spanish:
Articulo 52.- La Parte Contratante que otorgue ventajas, favores, franquicias, inmu-
nidades o privilegios a productos originarios de o destinados a cualquier otro pals
miembro o no miembro de la ALADI, por decisiones o acuerdos que no estdn previstos
en el Tratado de Montevideo 1980 deberA:
a. Informar a la otra Parte dentro de un plazo de quince (15) dias de suscrito el acuer-
do, acompafiando el texto del mismo y sus instrumentos complementarios.
b. Anunciar en la misma oportunidad la disposici6n a negociar, en un plazo de noventa(90) dias, concesiones equivalentes a las otorgadas y recibidas de manera global.
c. En caso de no legarse a una soluci6n mutuamente satisfactoria en las negociaciones
previstas en el literal b., las Partes negociardn compensaciones equivalentes, en un
plazo de noventa (90) dias.
d. Si no se lograra un acuerdo en las negociaciones establecidas en el literal c., la Parte
afectada podri al procedimiento de soluci6n de controversias vigente en el presente
Acuerdo.
293. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?' supra note 41. Mercosur encompasses approximately 200 million people with a
GDP totaling about 50% of Latin America's total GDP. Mercosur to negotiate possible entry into
NAFTA as a bloc BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 14,1994.
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ing the same favorable agricultural tariff concessions Chile granted Canada in their bilater-
al trade agreement signed in 1996.294 This is problematic for Chile because its agreement
with Mercosur specifically excluded many agricultural products.295
Thus, some commentators are of the opinion that Chile can no longer independently
negotiate with the NAFTA because, among other reasons, Chile's associate membership
agreement with Mercosur requires that any favorable tariff concession ceded by Chile to a
third party nation, such as those comprising the NAFTA, must also extend to all Mercosur
members.296 Other commentators, however, indicate that this agreement is "apparently
structured" so as to permit Chilean NAFTA accession without problems. 297 This has been
held to be true since Chile is not bound to Mercosur's common external tariff.298
Nevertheless, other negotiated terms of the Mercosur-Chile agreement include a free-
ing of tariffs on October 1, 1996, applied to a third of all products traded between the two
signatories.299 Furthermore, the Mercosur tariffs on Chilean products decreased from 8.2
percent to 5.6 percent.300 There is hope that by 2004, 70 percent of all trade between the
two parties will be tariff-free. 30 1 Indeed, with the Mercosur, Chile has access to the
Atlantic Ocean and Mercosur has access to the Pacific and more importantly, the Asian
market. 302
In summary, Chilean exports to Mercosur increased by 3 percent between October
1996 and June 1997.303 In addition, the rise in imports from Mercosur remained at the
same pace from the rest of the world-for a total increase of 8 percent.304 Indeed, Chile
wants its agreement with Mercosur to extend to services and to eliminate nontariff barri-
ers.30 5 Finally, Chile also wants to improve procedures for dispute settlement and to
include the automobile sector in their agreement. 306
294. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41.
295. Chile's Deal With the MERCOSUR, LATN AM. REG'L REP.: Max. & NAFTA REP., July 18, 1996, at 1.
These products include meat, comestible oil, and sugar, all of which are tariff protected for the
next 15 years. The Chilean wheat market will not be open to Mercosur until 2014. Id.
296. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41.
297. Gantz, supra note 39, at 400.
298. Id.
299. Chile LATIN AM. REG'L REP.: MEx. & NAFTA REP., Oct. 21,1997, at 4.
300. Id.
301. Id
302. Imogen Mark and David Pilling, Jilted Chile Hitches Up to Mercosur:. Customs Union Gains the
Region's Most Stable and Successful Economy, FIN. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at 3.
303. Chile, supra note 299.
304. Id. Total trade for Chile and Mercosur included U.S.$2.19 billion imports from and $1.32 billion




IV. Chile's Bilateral FTA. Is It a NAFTA "Light" or a Fullblown NAFMA?
Answer: Both.
The Canadians saw and jumped toward the opportunities available with a bilateral
trade agreement with Chile, however, the United States is slow to learn. Accordingly, Chile
reacted to U.S. inaction by pursuing this agreement as well as with Mercosur. 307 Both
seem on the right track since trade between Chile and Canada is projected to increase five
fold in the next decade over the current level of $670 million per year.308 Furthermore,
Chile's market is rapidly expanding---an expansion that is coupled with high consumer
purchasing power.309 In addition, Chile has a strong economy and an unemployment rate
of 5 to 6 percent. 310 Finally, it is unlikely that there will be a monetary crisis such as that
which soured the trade expected with Mexico through the NAFTA. 3 11 Also, unlike
Mexico, there is little concern in losing manufacturing jobs.312
In another context, the Chile-Canada bilateral trade agreement is taking money from
U.S. companies. For example, a Canadian supplier of packaged homes, Viceroy Homes
Ltd., outbid U.S. competitors for the business of a Chilean distributor.313 In addition,
examples of how U.S. companies are starting to use their Canadian subsidiaries to trade
with Chile include General Electric-Canada's bid to supply two sets of hydroturbines and a
generator for a hydroelectric project in southern Chile and Ford Motor Co. shipping "the
popular F series pickup trucks" to Chile.3 14
Nevertheless, the Chile-Canada bilateral free trade agreement both furthers and
detracts from the basics of the NAFTA framework as it relates to Chilean NAFTA acces-
sion. There are several reasons why the Canadian-Chilean free trade agreement creates
fundamental problems for Chilean accession to the NAFTA. First, Chile successfully nego-
tiated a provision that kept its price band mechanism for specific agricultural products.315
In the past, the United States branded these concessions as protectionist mechanisms to
the competitive disadvantage of some U.S. exports. 316 But the fact that Chile's Frei
administration secured these terms could be reasonably expected in light of the trade
307. Gantz, supra note 39, at 400.
308. Free Trade with Chile; Chile's Senate Ratifies a Free Trade Agreement with Canada That Would
Eliminate Most Tariffi Over the Next 18 Years, McCLEAN's, July 14. 1997, at 39.
309. Marsha Stopa, Chilly to Chile: Every Nation Is Eager for a Trade Pact with Chile Except, It Seems,




313. John Urquhart, Canada is Hot for Latin American Trade, Dow JoNEs NEws SERV.-WALL ST. J.
STORIES, Nov. 6, 1997.
314. Id.
315. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41.
316. Id Furthermore, 92% of exports will enter Canada tariff free, a status also applied to 76% of
Canadian exports of electronics and automobiles. Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile Trade. Accord with
Canada Sets Several Firsts, IN'IRaPRESS SERV., July 4, 1997. In addition, tariffs will be lifted on 91%
of Chilean agricultural products presently-a figure that will rise to 100% by the year 2003. Id.
Wheat flour, however, will retain its tariff protection until the year 2014. Id.
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deficit between Chile and Canada. 317 Indeed, the trade benefit was negotiated with an eye
toward reducing that deficit.318
Second, Chile secured a provision preserving Chile's capital retention program. 319
Through this program, foreign investment capital may not be returned to the originating
country for a maximum of one year.320 Third, Chile secured Canada's concession that 30
percent of portfolio investment will be deposited in a noninterest bearing account at the
Chilean Central Bank for up to a year.321
Fourth, the rule of origin requirements negotiated between Chile and Canada include
a 35 percent regional content requirement for a great variety of manufactured goods to be
traded tariff free.322 This requirement was intended to allow manufacturers the benefits of
317. Gonzalez, supra note 316.
318. Id. In 1996, Chilean exports to Canada totaled U.S. $140 million (out of total sales of U.S. $15.3
billion) while imports from Canada totaled U.S. $408 million (total deficit of U.S. $268 million).
Id.
319. Thomas A. O'Keefe, Andean Community Update, Mercosur Developments, and Progress Toward a
Free Trade Area of the Americas?", LATIN AM. L. Bus. REP., May 31, 1997. NAFTA rules of origin,
on the other hand, are arguably very favorable to Canada because, in demonstrating compliance,
regional calculations are easier for a country with its resources. Gantz, supra note 39, at 401.
320. Chile News: Chile commits to 30% "Encaje" in Canada Deal, EMERGING MARKETS REP., Nov. 15,
1997.
321. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41. Historically, the United States has held the opinion that such con-
cessions (i.e., capital retention program and portfolio investments) allow for strong barriers
against foreign investment, and are not tolerated in any NAFTA accession negotiations with
Chile. Id. Indeed, the 11% reduction in price, due to Canada's treaty with Chile, was an impor-
tant factor in awarding a U.S. $200 million order for cable-telephone technology from Nortrel,
instead of a U.S. company like Motorola, Lucent, or Scientific Atlanta, all of which manufacture
similar equipment. U.S. Regional Update, Chile -- AMCHAM: NAFTA Exclusion Hurts U.S.
Business, supra note 127. For the same reason, Quaker Fabric Company of Fall River,
Massachusetts, lost a $1.8 million Chilean account to a Mexican competitor. Prepared Testimony
of Joseph Gorman, Chairman and CEO of TRW, Inc., Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means;
Subcomm. on Trad4 supra note 5. In general, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has established
that U.S. exports are experiencing loss of opportunity to the amount of $480 million per year -- a
figure that will only rise in the future. Schumacher, supra note 34. Another example is found in
TRC Co. from Windsor, Connecticut, which engineered a $25 million landfill, yet is hobbled by
Chilean tariffs and laws requiring a 20% withholding from its fees. Magnusson, supra note 66.
Even further, over 50 joint Chilean-Canadian ventures are presently operating in Chile, some of
which are taking full advantage of shipping to other Latin American countries that have preferen-
tial trade with Chile, but not Canada. Urquhart, supra note 313.
322. Fast-Track, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41. Indeed, the NAFTA required 60% minimum content requirements
for a wide range of manufactured goods. Id. In comparison, the according minimum regional
content requirement is over 60%. O'Keefe, supra note 95.
Witer 1998 169
preferential access without a requisite change in current sourcing of materials and parts.3 23
In addition, the agreement, unlike the NAFTA, takes no account of promoting cross-bor-
der investments in the financial services sector, as well as excluding government procure-
ment.324 Finally, the agreement eliminates both the use of anti-dumping duties and coun-
tervailing duty cases against imports from either country immediately for duty free goods,
and for all others within six years. 325
Under this agreement, tariff exempt status was respectively conferred to 92 percent of
Chilean exports to Canada and 76 percent of Canadian exports to Chile.326 Furthermore,
the same treatment was given to 91 percent of Chilean agricultural products--lO0 percent
by 2003.327 However, the wheat flour tariff on imports from Canada will not be removed
until 2014, as well as for machinery, fertilizer, or other imported equipment.3 28
On the other hand, the Chile-Canada bilateral free trade agreement deals with several
areas in which Mercosur is lacking. For example, this agreement includes a side agreement
on environmental cooperation. 329 This agreement was modeled after the NAFTA, with
accommodation to minimize institutional requirements and with the idea that it would be
interim in nature with a pending Chilean NAFTA accession.330 Accordingly, this agree-
ment also includes treatment of investment, services, communications, and temporary
entry for business purposes. 331
In addition, the Chile-Canada FTA contains an agreement on labor cooperation.332
This agreement also departs in nature from the NAFTA based on its transitory nature.333
Primarily, this side agreement creates a Commission for Labor Cooperation, supported by
a National Secretariat in both countries. 334 Furthermore, this council may receive assis-
tance from working groups, committees, and experts that can be self assigned.3 35
323. Canada-Chile: Free Trade Agreement, Sept., 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1067 (1997) [hereinafter Free Trade
Agreement].
324. Gantz, supra note 39, at 400.
325. Id. Canada negotiated for similar concessions in the NAFTA, but the United States' position
countered, and ultimately won. O'Keefe, supra note 95. Furthermore, the elimination of anti-
dumping and countervailing duty actions between Chile and Canada are subject to a review after
five years. Gantz, supra note 39, at 405. Nonetheless, the inclusion of these provisions in the
Chile-Canada treaty is consistent with Canada's previous fight for their inclusion into the NAFTA
agreement and the Canadian government's eventual desire to "eliminate the use of anti-dumping
duties within NAFTA" Id.
326. Gonzalez, supra note 316.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 323.
330. kL
331. Gantz, supra note 39, at 400.
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V. Condusions.
The concept of western hemispheric integration, as roughly imagined in the early
nineteenth century by Simon Bolivar, Latin America's great liberator,336 and articulated
through the passing of the NAFTA and the Summit of the Americas, is up in the air. A
bitter division in this country's trade direction was primarily caused by the NAFTA's asso-
dated environmental and labor issues and by partisan politics. As a result, the window of
opportunity for Chile's ascension to the NAFTA, an almost given in 1994, has been attenu-
ated while politicians wrangle over the future health of the global economies of the twen-
ty-first century.
Selfishly and necessarily, the United States must promote its own commercial self-
interest as the frantic process of hemispheric integration charges forward. Indeed, the cru-
cial issue here is not whether protectionism, regionalism, multilateralism, trade diversion,
labor, or the environment are at stake; rather, the issue is that the prize (the Latin
American market) is coveted by the EU and Asia and any other possible competitor who
can pick up a phone and set up a trade accord. In simple terms, this issue really centers on
a race requiring immediate U.S. action, whether in the formation of a FTAA, an increase in
NAFTA membership, or in the securing of preferential trade agreements. This type of
action is needed for the continued strength of our economy in the new millennium.
Whether one loves or loathes the debate over the relative merits of free trade or pro-
tectionism, the United States cannot afford to remain idle while others jockey for the best
seat at the trade table. Of course, the United States must continue to provide the leader-
ship role in a class of international agreement it basically created. The complexities
accompanying market need, totalitarianism and corruption, drugs, and transient labor and
populations are the concepts the United States should not bow down to. However, by
active engagement in this race, the United States will secure its rightful place at the table,
while continuing to promote Latin America's permanent move away from the protection-
ism and state-dominated economic policies of the past. Thus, it is imperative that the
United States attend the 1998 presidential summit to be held in Chile with fast-track
authority enacted. This authority will ensure that the momentum created by the Miami
Summit of 1994 will allow for the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements primarily, but
not exclusively, with Chile. These agreements should be independent of the NAFTA.
Outside of the concerns raised or associated with article 52 of the Mercosur-Chile
agreement, by moving ahead with fast-track and establishing a bilateral trade agreement
instead of pursuit of NAFTA accession, the United States could solve some of the problems
with Chilean NAFTA accession. Primarily, popular and political success should be associ-
ated with a bilateral treaty because the NAFTA's environmental and labor side issues are as
complex as its rules of origin. Furthermore, we should also avoid the NAFTA dispute reso-
lutions. These provisions are problematic in terms of non-contiguous South American
countries. Secondly, these aspects of the NAFTA are better handled, if not better received
by Latin America, through independent and specific agreements. In addition, the divisive
stigma associated with the NAFTA could be left by the wayside.
336. Dusseau, supra note 2.
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Thus,- considering the prize at hand with fast-track, a bilateral trade deal with Chile
lacking the complexities of the NAFTA encompasses a better venue to restart the United
States' momentum in anticipation of the presidential summit of 1998 to be held in Chile.
Furthermore, taking the path of Canada, the United States should loosen its trading rigidi-
ties and conclusively negotiate less complicated and more advantageous agreements. More
importantly, the NAFTA stigma could be alienated, allowing the United States to solidify
its standing as the trade leader in this hemisphere by forging ties with Chile and by assert-
ing that U.S. leadership will point the way to the successful integration of this hemisphere.
The Chilean Minister of the Interior, Eduardo Aninat, concurred in some ways with this
belief by agreeing that a bilateral agreement is a worthy goal if both countries can negoti-
ate a "symmetrical" agreement based on NAFTA principles, such as those Chile enjoys with
Canada.337
337. Chile-Trade: Chile-US trade pact nears signing, supra note 177.
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Corrigendum
In Volume 3, Number 4, two tables were inadvertently left out of Alfredo G. Romero's
"The Letter of Intent in International Syndicated Financing: An Analysis of the English
and American Law from a Sovereign Borrower's Perspective." Pages 81 and 83 of that issue
should have appeared as follows:
